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13 Challenges and Contributions 
to the Conventional Wisdom 
KARL KAISER. JOHN J. KIRTON. AND JOSEPH P. DANI ELS 
Introduction 
Reform of the international financial architecture is a dynamic and rapidly 
changing problem that by nature does not have a definitive answer. Hence, 
one would expect substantial disagreement on reform measures among the 
contributors herein. Remarkably, there is a strong consensus that emerges 
here. This consensus stands in stark contrast to the often "contradictory and 
mutually incompatible" (Eichengreen, 1999. p. I) proposals o ffered 
elsewhere, primarily by economists and members of the policy community 
based in the United States. 
This concluding chapter considers the views of some ofthe leading, U.S.-
based authorities in the current debate on strengthening the international 
financial system, to identify their areas of overlap and divergence. The 
resulting, lengthy list of recommendations they provide is incrementalist in 
nature. It offers a baseline point of comparison for the evaluations assembled 
here. There is a general acceptance among these established authorities of the 
conventional wisdom on reforming the international financial architecture. 
The scholars and practitioners assembled in this volume. however. with their 
additional perspectives from Europe and Asia and North America beyond the 
United States, call for a bolder approach . They challenge the presumed 
effectiveness of many of the proposed reforms, offer new insights on 
encouraging stabilising behaviour of financial market participants, and add 
much-needed perspectives on the political process that is required for the 
development, acceptance, and monitoring of said reforms. 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the perspectives of some of 
the leading scholars on the international financial system . It then summarises 
the perspectives in the context of the core issue areas identified in the 
introduction to this text. Finally, it highlights the views offered in thi s volume, 
indicating the points of overlap and divergence with the conventional wisdom 
previously offered. 
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The Conventional Wisdom: A Brief Survey 
Arguably the best-known contribution to the current debate is Barry 
Eichengreen's book, Toward a New Financial Architecture: A Pracl ical Pos/-
Asia Agenda ( 1999). A prolific wri ter on the hi story of the internat iona l 
monetary system, Eichengreen is we ll pos itioned to assemble and assess the 
v iews and proposa ls on reform that have been adva nced by many prom inent 
indiv iduals and authorities . I 
Eichengreen argues that most of the favo ured proposa ls are incompatibl e 
j w ith one another because di fferent people view the problem of finan c ia l 
instability from divergent perspectives. His own proposa ls are advanced, in 
contrast, on the bas is of fi ve clear assumptions, as fo ll ows. First, fin ancia l 
liberalisation allows market to allocate capita l in the most effic ient manner 
and, therefore, has s ignificant benefits. Secondly, a!1d in contrast to others 
(such as Harold James 1999), integration of fin ancial markets is irreversible. 
Thirdly, information asymmetries are pervas ive in financia l markets and , 
therefore, financi a l safety nets are needed in light of the instability generated 
by these asymmetries. Fourthly, bankruptcy codes are needed, as information 
and transactions costs prevent markets from promptly reso lv ing fi nanc ia l 
cri ses. Finally, po litica l cons iderations w ill influence economic reform . 
Eichengreen chooses, as do the other establi shed scholars rev iewed here, 
to offer " recommendations [that] may seem unambitious .. . but have a chance 
of being implemented" ( 1999, p. 4) . His approach is to o ffer proposal s that a re 
practical in light of the fact that though financ ial markets are ever-
increasingly global , they continue to be regulated at the nationa l leve l. Hi 
recommendations form the benchmark for thi s brief rev iew and are 
summarised as fo llows. 
Because of the problem of asymmetric in fo rmation in fin anc ia l markets. 
accounting and auditing standards should be advanced and adopted. T he 
adoption of standards, and the monitoring of compliance wi ll req uire a co-
ordinated effort among international , nationa l, and private sector bodi es and 
should be addressed within the context of reforming the Intern ati ona l 
Monetary Fund. [n regard to improved inform ation, Eichengreen spec ifica lly 
call s for : 
Better information on businesses, banks. and sovereign nations, inc luding: 
ri gorous disclosure requirements; 
the use of internationally recogni sed auditing and acco unting 
standards; 
po 
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improved corporate governance standards so that claimants can 
monitor and control ; financial decisions; 
intern ~ltional monitoring of compliance and its public di ssemination . 
The pace offinancialmarket liberalisation has been much more rapid than 
increases in supervision and regulation, particularly in emerging economie 
What is needed, therefore , is: 
Improved supervision and regulation olfinancial markets and market 
participants, such as: 
improved ri sk-management techniques of banks; 
improved regulation and supervision; 
limiting or taxing bank (principally foreign currency denominated) 
borrowing abroad, specifically Chilean-style capital-inflow taxes. 
I n regard to debt clauses, Eichengreen admits that no single country would 
pursue this alone as it might send an unfortunate signal to the markets. Hence. 
actions of this type can be accomplished only on a co-ordinated basis. His 
recommendation here is : 
International Debt Restructuring, such as: 
adding majority voting and shareholding clauses to loan contracts; 
collective-representation clauses, including; provisions for a 
representative to coordinate creditors in the case of sovereign debt, 
and clauses providing that a minimum percentage of bondholders 
must agree for legal action to be taken ; 
the creation of standing committees of creditors; 
IMF lending in arrears, when appropriate. 
Eichengreen argues that the IMF must realise that it cannot so lve all the 
problems of the international financia l system by itself. The IMF must work 
with appropriate private sector organisations.and international comm ittees. In 
addition , the IMF should promote exchange rate flexibility as this will 
encourage agents to hedge foreign exchange exposures, reducing insolvency 
that results from unexpected exchange rate changes and Chilean-sty le capital 
controls. Hence, he calls for: 
Reform of the IMF. to include: 
working with appropriate bodies to establish standards: 
" 
.. 
I' 
" 
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monito ring member country com pliance w ith these standa rds: 
becoming a pro-active coordinato r of debt restructur ing: 
enhanc ing its legitimacy through greate r di sc los ure and transparency. 
form ing a new consensus of appropriate macroeconom ic po l ic ies in 
light of today s integrated fin anc ia l markets, promoting Chilea n- ty le 
capita l control s, and encouraging fl ex ible exchange rates. 
Shortly after Eichengreen's ana lys is, A lan Blinde r offered hi s own Ei~hl 
Steps to a New Financial Order ( 1999). Both hi s theme and recommendations 
echo those of Eichen green. Blinder mainta ins that fin anc ia l instability cannot 
be e l im inated, but sees the current s ituation of numerous and severe c rises as 
unacceptable . Blinder a lso concurs that ostentatious proposa ls are a dead-end 
and that it is " Better to stick w ith more modest pl ans that require li ttl e or no 
institution-building. The world ' s poor cannot wa it fo r grand edifices to be 
built" ( 1999, p. 53). 
Five of the e ight steps recommended by Blinder are in clear agreement 
w ith the proposals of Eichengreen: Flex ible exchange rates. restri cting 
excess ive short-term borrowing in fore ign currency, sound mac roeconom ic 
and fin anc ia l po li c ies (particularly improved bank supervis ion and accountin g 
and auditing standards), recons iderati on of lMF austeri ty programs inlightof 
the modern internationa l eco nomy, and e tabli shing procedures fo r debt 
settlement, inc luding co ll ective act ion clauses. In additi on. Blinde r argues fo r 
a proper sequencing of capita l market libera li sation. T hi s inc ludes 
conside ration of Chilean-sty le contro l on short-term ca pita l inflows and 
tempering the IM Ps encouragement of premature li bera li sation. Blinder 
a rgues that the 1M F pays too much attenti on to cred itors and too I itt le to the 
innocent bystanders in a fin anc ia l c rises. Hence, he argues that more resources 
should be devoted to protecting the soc ia l safety nets of nati ons from 
experi enc ing a fin anc ia l me ltdown. Fina lly, he argues fo r preventat ive funds. 
such as the lM F's Contingent Cred it Line, to be ava il able fo r countr ies that 
fo llow sound po lic ies, in order to keep spectators at bay. He does not. 
however, go as fa r as to recommend reg iona l agreements, though he does not 
address these expli c itly o r rul e them out. 
A third set of proposals has come from the Counc il on Fore ign Re lations. 
whi ch in 1998 sponsored the Independent Task Force of the Internationa l 
Financ ia l Architecture. Its rep0l1 was authored by Morri s Go ldste in (Coun c il 
on Fore ign Re lations 1999). T he bas ic princi ples of the repol1 i th at the 
burden of refo rm is on the emerg ing eco nomies and the ir credi tors. but that 
partic ipati on is required by the industri a lised economies as is refo rm and 
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redirection of the IMF and the World Bank. The Counc il offers seven 
recommendations. Five of these pa ra lle l those of Eichengreen (who was a 
member of the Task Force) and Blinde r, though the context is s li ghtly 
di ffe rent. 
T he Task Force recommends th at countri es that pract ice "good 
housekeeping", (which includes sound macroeconomic po li cy, a strong and 
we ll-regulated banking system, compli ance with intern at iona l tandards for 
di sclosure, and avo idance of excess ive shol1-te rm borrowing) be rewa rd ed 
w ith more favo urable IMF lending te rms and lower regul atory ca pita l 
requirements fo r banks lending to these countri es . In addi t ion. it proposes 
avo idance of excess ive short-term capital flows w ith Chi lean-sty le capita l 
contro ls, flexibl e exchange rates, private secto r burden sharing, and co ll ecti ve 
action clauses, and reform and refocus ing of IMF and World Bank 
respons ibilities. 
The Task Force a lso suggests less IMF lendin g, spec ifica lly a return to 
norm al lendin g limits of 100 to 300 percent of country quota. T he be lief he re 
is that less lending w i II change private agents ' expectati ons about future 
lendin g and reduce the mora l hazard problem. Lending should focus on 
smoothing operati ons in currency markets, he lp fi nance bank re tructuring, 
and provide fo r soc ia l safety nets, as advocated by Blinder. Fina lly, the Task 
Forces advocates greate r po liti ca l support of reform measures. As w ith 
Eic hengreen, there is an admiss ion that po litica l cons iderations and w ill 
power will drive o r stymi e reform effo rts . The Counc il urge g reate r 
in vo lvement of the emerging economies in the process. They ca ll on th e 
Interim Committee, the Financ ia l Stability Forum (FSF). and the pres idents 
of the reg iona l deve lopments banks to convene a meeting of the fin ance 
mini sters to set an agenda and tim e line. 
A fourth maj or set of proposa ls comes from a sy mpos ium whose res ults 
were repo l1ed in the Journal of Economic Perspectives and ummari sed by 
Fredric Mishkin ( 1999). T hough the sy mpos ium covered a great dea l of 
te rrito ry, three iss ue areas fo und in a ll of the proposa ls above are trea ted in 
g reater deta il. T hese are the ro le of internati ona l in stituti ons, banking 
stability, and capital contro ls. Mishkin and Rogoff ( 1999) concur w ith th e 
Counc il on Forei gn Relations that an internati ona l lender of last resort is 
needed, but a rgue it is not practica l to env is ion one w ith "deep pockets" . 
Mishkin 's argument is based on the mora l hazard problem that is created with 
such an instituti on while Rogoff foc usses on the amount of resources that 
would be required. Rogoff reaches furth er, exam ining many othe r proposa ls 
fo r inte rnationa l institution formation and reform ation. inc luding the 
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estab li shment of a fi nanc ia l c ri s is manager and an intern ati ona l bankruptcy 
court . He conc ludes that none of th ese proposa ls are feas ible at thi s time. 
In thi s sympos ium, Caprio and Honohan ( 1999) dea l w ith th e problem o f" 
banking stability in emerg ing countri es. They injti a ll y a sert that capi ta l 
requi rements are not suffic ient for dea ling w ith banks in emerg ing nat ions. as 
in many of these nat ion fin anc ia l libera li sation occurred fas te r th an the 
establi shm ent of adequate regulati on and superv is ion of inte rm edia ri es . 
Hence, what is needed is better and increased supervis ion of interm edia ries 
in these na t ions. As they see it, a princ iple prob lem that po li cymakers must 
gras p is that the so lutions th at work in industri a l ised econom ies may not work 
I in emerging economies because of di ffe rences in marke t vo latil ity and the 
institut iona l setting. Oppress ive regulation, however, i not the o lut ion. An 
environment that prov ides a framework of incenti ves that encourages 
di vers ificati on and ba lanc ing ofl oans and competition is one th at enhance the 
efficiency and stability of these banking systems .• 
Sebasti an Edwards ( 1999) task is to cons ider the cap ita l contro ls 
recommend ed in a ll of the proposa ls noted above. He argues that the ev idence 
shows th at contro ls on capita l outflows are ineffecti ve while the benefi ts of 
contro ls on the inflow of capita l, such as those used by Chil e, are overrated . 
Nonethe less, contro ls on short-te rm capita l inflows may extend the matu rity 
of debt and , therefore, be a usefullemporary stopgap measure. Ultim ate ly, 
what is needed is the obvious medley of prudent macroeconomic po li c ies, 
banking regul at ion and supervis ion, and fl ex ible exchange rates. 
The Consensus of the Conventional Wisdom 
T he authors rev iewed above agree that the worst of the As ian c ri IS I now 
past, but that s imilar fin ancia l fa ilu res are inev itab le in the future. g iven th e 
current environment. Libera li sed fi nancia l markets w ill a lways be prone to 
se iz ing up . No reform effort , no matter how comprehens ive it mi ght be. can 
complete ly e liminate thi s aspect. Li bera li sed fi nanc ia l markets are celta inl y 
beneficia l, as they di rect capita l to its most prod ucti ve function. Yet when 
markets a re libera l ised prio r to necessary III icroeconom ic and macroeconolll ic 
re form s (such as proper monetary, fi sca l, and exchange rate po lic ies. and 
appropriate bankin g and domestic financ ia l market regu lati on and 
superv is ion), large and sudden inflows and outfl ows of short-term cap ita l can 
overwhe lm an emerg ing nati on's system of interm edi aries, leading to a 
fin anc ia l me lt-down. It appears th at thi s is prec ise ly what happened in East 
As ia from 1997 onwa rd. 
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Though financial markets a re becom ing more g loba lly integrated. they 
remain regulated at the domestic leve l. For emergi ng nat ions th at re ly heav i Iy 
on their domestic banking system fo r the a llocation of capi tal. and that have 
less than sufficient competition, regulat ion and superv is ion, I iberali at ion has 
proved to be a risky process. A great deal needs to be done here . T he 
industrial ised nat ions need to set the example for the emerging nations 
through the approval and adoption of accountin g. disclosure. and aud iting 
standards. Much is now being done in generat ing such standards. The difficult 
task that lies ahead will be ensurin g their accepta nce and monitoring 
compliance with them. The G7 , IM F. and the committees o r nat iona l 
regulators must co-ordinate their efforts in this regard . T hey must further 
dev ise a system of incentives that encourages market partici pants and the 
governments of the emerging and deve loping nat ions to comply . 
There is no question that informational asym metri es pervade tinancial 
markets and that this type of market fai lure is amplified in in ternationa l 
transactions. Improvements in transparency and surve ill ance are important. 
but in and of themselves will not accompli sh much. Rather, there is a need for 
more draconian measures such as capital contro ls on short-term intlows. This 
type of measure is offered with trepidation. but offered nonethe less. The 
purpose is to extend the average maturity of debt and reduce the rei iance on 
bank borrowing from abroad . 
Private sector in vo lvement is certainly a common e lement of a ll the 
proposa ls above. Each col lection has ca ll ed for shareho lder c lauses on loans 
and collective-representation clauses on debt. These ty pes of measure have 
the potential to reduce the quality of debt issued by sending the wrong type 
of message to market participants. As a result. no nation would unilate ra ll y 
adopt these measures. A coordinated effort is required. The prospect of a co-
ordinated effort. however, seems unlikely as longas the United States remains 
firm in its opposition to reform in this area . 
T he a rea that rece ives vil1ually no attention at a ll is the ro le of the G7 in 
the overall process. This is quite un fo rtunate a the G7. both at the leaders. 
and Finance Ministers leve l. representthe critica l political force necessa ry tor 
any reform to take place . While ea rlier' G7 ac ti on may have proven 
di sappointing in its foresight. timeliness, and content (Danie ls 1999). as the 
Council on Foreign Relat ions Task Force rightly argues. greater po litica l 
upport of reform efforts is needed. The G7. and the extended fora of the G7. 
are essentia l in coordinating the activities of the various bodies at work on the 
formation of standards, the promulgation of such standards. and th e 
encouragement of their adoption . 
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Challenges and Contributions to the Conventional Wisdom 
The ana lyses offered in thi s vo lume conta in a num ber of poi nts of 
convergence w ith the views presented above. However on the who le they 
mount a cha ll enge to the conventiona l wisdom by add ing a more diverse and 
often bo lder view on the o ri g in of recent crises. th e spec ific directi on to be 
taken, and the po liti ca l process that w ill steer the entire operati on. 
T here is a consensus on the benefits of g loba li sati on of fi nanc ia l markets 
th at is dri ven home in the works of Rugman and Danie ls. T hese auth ors a lso 
agree that short-term capita l fl ows can be destabili s ing, whereas fore ign direct 
investment is not. Rugman goes further on thi s issue by po inting out that the 
process of integration is in fact driven by fore ign direct investment acti vitie 
of mult inat iona l enterpri ses. The authors diverge from th e conventiona l 
w isdom by shi fti ng away fro m the focus on short- te rm fl ows. as ca pita l 
contro ls on short- te rm inflows are, at best, second best po li c ies . In additi on 
to the obv ious reforms needed in banking and fi nancia l market superv is ion 
and regul ation, what is ca lled fo r is a regiona l system of incent ives that 
encourages long-te rm investment, as opposed to schemes that d iscourage 
short-te rm capita l. Indeed, Rugman argues th at the lack of such a strategy is 
a centra l explanation of the East As ian crisis. 
There is a lso much agree on the proper ro le of the IM P. Gia nnini concurs 
that there is a ro le fo r a lender of last reso rt. He leads the debate in a new 
directi on by a rguing that the IMP is a lready heading away from be ing an 
international lender of last resort and toward becom ing a lender of credibi I ity. 
T hat is, the IM F can provi de c redibility to otherw ise sound economies that 
have experi enced a cris is by lending into arrears and by enabling them to 
access private capita l courses . Von Furstenberg adds, build ing on Goodhart 
( 1999), that borrowed money should not be used to defend exchange rate 
pegs. What von Furstenberg a lso brings to th e debate is the rea li sati on th at 
most of the cri s is countries have abandoned pegged reg imes and the cha llenge 
now remains one of fi nding the appropriate regime. It appears that regiona l 
arra ngements are inev itable with many nationa l currenc ies di sappearing in the 
process. 
That reform of bankin g supervis ion and regul at ion is essenti a l to 
successful fin anc ia l market regul ati on is unarguable. Kiuchi . however. po ints 
out that a c ri t ica l e lement miss ing in the debate over reform is how po l itician 
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compound the problem by overriding banking offic ia ls and regul ato rs. 0 
refo rm, regardl ess of how we ll intenti oned it might be. can be success ful 
w ithout proper po litica l backing. There is a need. the refore. to deve lop 
a lte rnati ves to domesti c banking systems that a ll ow fo r direct fi nanc ing. 
Hence, Kiuchi argues fo r the deve lopment of an As ian bond market which 
would replace some of the short-term bank borrowing abroad. and a lso extend 
the maturity of debt. 
A lack of the type of transparency that is ca lled fo r in the conventiona l 
w isdom had littl e to do with the outbreak o r the East As ian c ri s is. as argued 
by vo n Furstenberg. In fo rm ation asymmetri es a re an important e lement in 
such c ri ses, but the measures currently env is ioned w i II do I ittle to prevent 
s im i lar c rises fro m occurring in the future. What von Furstenberg brings to the 
debate is the importance of political transparency. That is, bei ng c lea r as to 
moti ves and to whom the benefits of reform w i II accrue. \;v i II do much to 
enhance the credibility of the re fo rm process itse lf. Wa lter echoes thi s 
scept ic ism about the impact of transparency and argues th at much more needs 
to be done in the way of bank capital requirements. Wa lte r concur w ith the 
conventiona l w isdom that a new mechani sm is needed to a ll ow bankruptcy 
and that the reca pitalisation offa iling fi nanc ia l instituti ons should be ha lted. 
The Role of the G7 
Among a ll the authors in thi s vo lume, there is a w ides pread consensus abo ut 
the central rol e the G7 plays in responding to internati ona l fi nanc ia l c ri es. 
and strengthening the inte rnati ona l fi nanc ia l system to reduce the mass ive 
economic, po litica l and soc ia l costs w hich such cri s is can exact upon so many. 
This consensus embraces the re levance and leade rship ro le of the G7 in these 
issues, its re lati onship to th e other bodi es charged with the ir management. the 
effectiveness of its perfo rm ance in cris is response and system/reconstruct ion. 
and where and how it should concentrate its efforts in the fu ture. 
The Relevance and Leadership Role of/he 0 7 
There is overwhe lming agreement that the G7 and its leade rship have been. 
and should be, centra l in the process of responding to internati ona l fin anc ia l 
cri ses and construct ing a new system to meet the needs of a now g loba l ised 
world . Bayne shows how res pondin g to c ri s is and reconstructing the 
internati onal fin anc ia l system in its various dim ensions has recurrently been 
" 
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the central tasks of the G7, and that it have been critica l in so lving diffe rence 
that have pers isted at lower levels, keeping up the pressure to ensure what 
members have agreed is properly carried out, and in explain ing andj ust ify ing 
their actions to outside countries and the broader public. Kirton regards it, 
rather than the I MF or US alone, as play ing the central part during the cri sis 
of 1997-99. Daniels argues that the GTs perfo rmance in coordinat ion and 
im plementation wi II determ ine the ultimate success or fa i lure of the effort to 
reform the international ti nancial system. 
Even those with more cr itica l views admit its relevance. Kiuchi. amidst 
hi s ympathy for regional so lutions, views the 7 as hav ing an important 
leadership role in catalyzing needed action at an ea rly stage, and in helping 
Asian nations develop guidel ines to help them develop their financial systems. 
Wood sees the G7 as central to the global coordination of economic poli cies. 
even though he argues it has now become an "anachronism" given the ri sing 
we ight of developing countries, shi fts in trade compefiti veness, and the new 
vulnerabili ty among all nations brought by globali sat ion. Von Furstenberg 
admits the useful role the G7 played in endors ing IM F incubated codes and 
in strengthening the IMF 's Interim Committee, even while recognis ing the 
limited relevance of such an emphas is. Walter suggests. in keeping with the 
Ameri can leadership model of international co-operation and G7 effect iveness 
(Putnam and Bayne 1987), that the G7 can playa key ro le in prov iding the 
United States with the junior partner it needs to work with, in a world of 
"Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" . Gianini approves of the 7- inspired 
in formal ways devised to deal with the Asian cri sis and Korea, and the GTs 
creation of the Financial Stability Forum . Only Rugman, wi th hi s emphasis 
on the role offoreign direct investment, multinational enterpri se ' s regional ism 
and regional institutions, implicitly casts doubt in the relevance of the G7 
itse lf in the broader scheme. 
The G 7 '.\' Relationship to the Other Financial institutions 
At the same time. there is an equally strong conviction that the G7 can act 
perfo rm its needed role if it works in tandem with the establi hed multilateral 
organisations regional bodies, in ways that incorporate more full y the work 
of outside countries and private sector fo rums. Bayne underscores the need 
to ground GTs decision in the formal constitutional and institutional structure 
of established international organi sation such as the IM F if they are to be 
effective in the long run . Kirton shows, consistent with the model of 
democrati c institutionali sm for explaining G8 perfo rmance (Kirton and 
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Daniels 1999, Kokotsis and Daniels 1999). how the G7 needed the IMF. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development(l RBD). and reg ional 
development banks as a nest for catalysing co-operation and for securin g 
resources to help stem crisis of 1997-9. For Danie ls, it is the G7 that can help 
provide the badly needed clarification of the roles of the IMF and IBRD. 
Kiuchi calls for an enhancement of the IMF's authority to deal with capital 
account liberalisation . For von Furstenberg, and Walter the I MF and BIS were 
central in generating the standards to secure greater transparency, with the G7 
endorsing their work, although the former sees the IMF as poorly posi ti oned 
to engender the needed moves away from floating exchange rate regimes and 
into the world of reg ional monetary union . For Rugman. in contrast, 
multilateral and plurilateral bodies such as the Organ isation for Econom ic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GAIT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have failed to 
provide the needed rules for investment liberalisation, while regional bodies 
are busy generating results . 
The need to involve outsiders in the work of the G7 is underscored by 
many of the analyses in this volume. Kiuchi points to the need for reg ional 
arrangements such as an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and regional policy co-
ordination, or bilateral plans such as the New Miyazawa Initiative. Wood 
applauds the Cologne G7's decision to enlarge the FSF and give new 
responsibilities to the IMF's renamed International Finance and Monetary 
Committee, as the start of a much-needed process of greater inclusion. Kirton 
notes how the G7 broadened to include others through the FSF and G22 in 
devising the new system. Daniels echoes this plea to include large developing 
countries. Bayne, expanding on his earlier call (Bayne 1999) and noti ng the 
success of the process leading to the Cologne debt initiative, points to the 
importance, especially in the wake of the failed Seattle WTO meeting, of 
better communication with public and civil soc iety actors. 
The Effectiveness of G7 Action in Crisis Response and System 
Reconstruction . 
All the authors point further to the wisdom and effectiveness ofG7 action in 
crisis response and system reform, although niost also identify instances when 
G7 agreement and action was poorly conceived, insufficient, o r badly 
executed. Bayne 's review of the G7's four major efforts durin g its first 25 
years reveals a variable record, .rang ing from a high Iy but not tota lIy effect ive 
r 
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response in 1975, through to a much delayed impact on middle income debt 
relief from 1982 onward, relief of debt of the poorest from 1988 onward, and 
cris is response and ystem reconstructi on from 1994 to the present. Wood 
believes the Co logne communique makes a ignificant contribution to 
strengthening the internati onal financial architecture, bur give the repoli a 
very ca utious eva luation, and one that expre ses skeptici sm about the ab ility 
of the G7 to implement it effective ly in the absence of broader participation 
from the developing countries themselves . He furtherj udges the G 7 in ge nera I 
to be hi ghly effect ive in macroeconomic co-ord inatio n. but note its ad hoc. 
cases by case approach to developing country debt relief in the 1980s left the 
, system highly vulnerable to the crises of the 1990s. The hi ghest marks come 
fi'om Kilion, who concludes the G7 beat markets in South Korea. Brazi I, and 
over private sector burden sharin g, and successfully contained As ian and 
g loba l financial crises, if through the provision of "just in time' "just enough' 
leadership . He concurs with Bayne that it was ultilTlate ly action by the G7 
leaders themselves th at was needed, and that the G7 leaders were much better 
at responding to crises than at foreseeing and preventin g them. 
The economists in this vo lume substantially agree with this portrait. 
a lthough offer more harsh judgements abo ut the market rationality of many 
of the particular decisions the G7 produces. Kiuchi suggests the G7 has been 
effective in its de faCIO ta k of survei llance and coord inati on of exchange 
rates . Daniels ees the G7 Finance mini ster' report to the leaders at the 
Co logne Summit as a comprehensive, hi gh quality document that reflects well 
the work being done by the G7 and others since the Halifax Summ it of 1995. 
and one that does an exce llent task of fram ing the current situation. He does, 
however, note the G7 at Cologne provided little detail on private sector 
involvement in crisi prevention, and was not firm enough in its conclusions 
on exchange rate regimes. Walter, while implicitly approving the FSF. points 
to the need to address more basic and hitherto neglected i ue. Von 
Furstenberg remains the most crit ica l, declaring that its HI P Initi ative i a 
debt trap, that its approach to transparency on Iy helps those at the top of the 
hi erarchy, that this approach wi ll do very little to reduce the ri sk o r financial 
cri ses occurrin g in the future, and that the G7 Report underplayed the role of 
exchange rate regimes in emerging economies in the overa ll architectura l 
effort. 
The G7's Focus for the Future 
Finally, many authors in this vo lume have c lear view a to how the G7 
Challenge.l· and CUl1fri/JII l iuns IV Ihe Convel1fiol1a/lVist/o/l) lJJ 
should proceed in the future. Bayne ca lls for a broadening and hilt o f 
attention, through the G7 correcting their neglect of the trade ystem as their 
first priority for Okinawa 2000. This in vo lves reso lve their internal 
differences on trade libera li sation, restoring the authori ty of the WTO. making 
their own poli cies and the WTO more responsive to the requirements of 
developing countri es, especiall y small and poor ones. and gett ing the 
Millennium Round successfull y launched. Wood argues with equal conviction 
that in the fu ture G7 decision making will have to be more inclusive of the 
views of certain large developing countries. and that G7 countries should give 
technical ass istance to LDC's to help them deve lop mechani sms to reduce 
systemic ri sk. Kiuchi suggests the G7 should prov ide leadership to secure a 
de/acto target zone mechanism for exchange rates among the big three. give 
the IMF authority for capital account management. and look with favour on 
reg ional co-operation on macroeconomics poli cy and the developm ent of 
Asian bond market. 
It is Daniels who prov ided the boldest vision of the GTs req uired role in 
the future. He declares that the G7 must play the essenti al task of managi ng 
the many bodies at work in reforming the international financial architecture. 
To do so it must co-ordinate the overa ll process. serve as a dr iv ing force for 
the implementation of agreements, and act as the lead ing advocate of benet i ts 
of capital account libera li sation. It is thus clear that. despi te the substantial 
steps forward made by the G7 at Cologne. their central ro le and to rm idable 
challenge in strengthening the international fin ancial system to meet the needs 
of the new millennium will remai n active in the years to come. 
Note 
Of course thl! literature on linancia l crises and re/onns to the illlernationa l linancial 
archi tecture is substan tial. as evident in the collective referl!nces to thi s text. We lilCllS 
only a few of the most widely·distributed publications hen: so as to derive a concise 
sUlllmary. For an excellent symposi um on the Tequila Crisis of I <)<).j·'i5. we rcJi:r thc 
reader to volume 23 of the Jllurnal ()/ lJa ll ~il1g and Finance ( I l)l)'i) . 
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